[This Iran war post is even thinner than usual at launch due to still being a bit addled from travel. Please come back at 7:30 AM EDT or refresh your browsers then for a final version]
After various press leaks suggesting that Trump viewed more kinetic attacks on Iran as too risky and thought keeping the blockade on as effective, and even ones that depicted the Administration as considering declaring victory and exiting, the latest reading of the Trump fever chart is that he is back to favoring more pounding. It seems that the Iran threat to take on the blockade, as in attack the US Navy even at its present remove from Iran, has not gotten the attention it warrants. More on that soon.
The latest Trump sighting per the BBC in Oil price hits highest since 2022 after report Trump to be briefed on new Iran options:
Oil prices jumped to their highest since 2022 after a report that the US military is set to brief President Donald Trump on new plans for potential action in the Iran war.
US Central Command has prepared a plan for a wave of “short and powerful” strikes on Iran to try to break the deadlock in negotiations with Tehran, news site Axios reported. The BBC has contacted US Central Command and the White House for comment.
Brent crude rose by almost 7% to more than $126 (£94) a barrel at one point, the highest since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine…
After reaching $126.31 a barrel at one point in Asian trade, the price of Brent crude fell back to around $116 in European trade…
In the UK, petrol currently costs an average of 157p a litre, according to motoring group RAC, which is 24p higher than before the start of the war. Diesel is at nearly 189p a litre, up 46p compared with its pre-war price.
But the potential impact is wider than just fuel prices. The UK government has warned people could face higher energy, food and flight ticket prices as a result of the war.
An aside: the fact that the UK officialdom and its press is now citing the broader costs of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is significant.
Bloomberg called out the continuing US-Iran staredown in its headline: US and Iran Stuck in Standoff as Oil Prices Soar to Wartime High
- The US and Iran showed little sign of breaking their impasse and agreeing to another round of peace talks, with President Donald Trump saying his navy’s blockade is working.
- US military commanders are set to brief Trump on new plans for Iran, including a plan for a short wave of strikes on Iran to break the negotiating deadlock.
- Trump told Axios the blockade of Iran’s ports is “somewhat more effective than the bombing” and “choking” the country by restricting its oil exports….
Brent oil rose to a wartime high as traders factor in an even longer closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a potential breakdown of the US and Iran’s shaky ceasefire, which has been in place since around April 7. Brent surged as much as 7.1% to more than $126 a barrel on Thursday, before paring gains to $121.40.
Mind you, both stories rely on the underlying Axios account. And the CENTCOM briefing must have been previously scheduled since it requires some analysis.1 But the flip side is that Professor Mohammed Marandi has been saying that Iran expects another US attack, and it needs to come pretty soon, given that heat levels in the Gulf are about to rise dramatically, making any ground operation extremely difficult.2
A story in Reuters indicates that at a minimum, there are divisions in the Administration on what to do:
From the article:
U.S. intelligence agencies are studying how Iran would respond if President Donald Trump were to declare a unilateral victory in the two-month-old war that has killed thousands and become a political liability for the White House, two U.S. officials and a person familiar with the matter said.
The intelligence community is analyzing the question along with others at the request of senior administration officials. The goal is to understand the implications of Trump potentially pulling back from a conflict that some officials and advisers worry could contribute to deep Republican losses at the midterm elections later this year, according to the sources.
While no decision has been made – and Trump could easily ramp back up military operations – a quick de-escalation could ease political pressure on the president, even as it could leave behind an emboldened Iran that could eventually rebuild its nuclear and missile programs and threaten U.S. allies in the region….
It is not clear when the intelligence community would complete its work, but it has previously analyzed the likely reaction of Iran’s leaders to a U.S. declaration of victory.
In the days following the initial bombing campaign in February, intelligence agencies assessed that if Trump were to declare victory and the U.S. drew down its forces in the region, Iran would likely view it as a win, one of the sources said.
If Trump instead said the U.S. had won but maintained a heavy troop presence, Iran would likely see it as a negotiating tactic, but not one that would necessarily lead to the end of the war, the source said.
“CIA is not familiar with the intelligence community’s reported assessment,” Liz Lyons, director of the agency’s office of public affairs, said in a statement after the publication of this story. The CIA declined to answer Reuters’ specific questions about its current work on Iran.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.
The reason for quoting this piece at some length is the CIA denial, as opposed to mere refusal to comment. CIA Chief John Ratcliffe is a hard-core Israel backer and as recently as mid-April, went to Jerusalem to talk with Netanyahu. One can infer that the Director of National Intelligence, as in Tulsi Gabbard’s office, is having to cut the CIA out of consideration of any non-escalatory options. Mind you, I doubt that will succeed but the attempt is interesting.
Back briefly to what still seems to be Trump’s preferred option, even if not strongly so, of keeping the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz on and hoping Iran will cry uncle rather than suffer damage to its oil wells as its storage fills up.
That is silly. As we pointed out, Iran exported pretty much nada in 2019 and 2020 yet seems to have suffered no lasting infrastructure harm. Bloomberg helpfully showed that that wasn’t even the first time:
Iran appears to have figured out how to keep enough pressure in old wells in a shutdown to prevent meaningful damage to its oil fields.
And as we described long-form yesterday, Iran has more export routes now than then, including by rail to China, through six corridors just opened up by Pakistan, and via the Capsian Sea to Russia.3
However, the fact that Iran can endure the US blockade does not mean it is advantageous to Iran to sit back and (again) take it.
After reports that Trump rejected Iran’s preconditions for negotiations & resuming the naval blockade on Iran, reports are coming in that Iran is examining ‘non-negotiated options’ to lift the naval blockade. https://t.co/gt79pALxaT
— Arya Yadeghaar (Backup) (@AryJeayBackup) April 29, 2026
Strategic reasons for Iran to take action include:
1. Iran taking on the US Navy, ideally sooner rather than later, could throw a monkey wrench in whatever plans CENTCOM is cooking up for an attack
2. If the winning game is tit for tat, merely refusing to negotiate might not be an adequate punishment for breaking the ceasefire deal,4 particularly in light of US actions:
The US regime hijacked a ship carrying medical equipment including dialysis supplies and is still holding 22 crew members hostage https://t.co/6c5trxstGb
— Max Blumenthal (@MaxBlumenthal) April 29, 2026
3. If we believe that Iran (as it has before) can endure a no-sea-trade situation, that implies that the impasse over the Strait of Hormuz could persist until the economy of the US suffers so much damage that it becomes untenable for the Administration to persist (but as a discussion below between Douglas Macgregor and Daniel Davis suggests, Trump no longer cares about public opinion, otherwise he’d be trying harder to find an off ramp). That could take a while, particularly given how much of Congress is captured by the Israel lobby. The impact of the present duration is expected to produce starvation in some poor countries. The human cost is set to rise rapidly the longer the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.
Given that the Shia believe in defending underdogs and innocents, one has to think at least some Iranians are not happy about Iran being a party to mass hunger, even if they are not the main driver. One can similarly think from a more cynical power perspective that it behooves Iran to show as much cognition as possible of the humanitarian crisis underway and that it is doing what it can to mitigate that while fighting an existential fight (this theme has been absent in Iran’s otherwise extremely skilled messaging).
More cynically, Iran may want to prevent a global economic collapse, which is what a long closure of the Strait of Hormuz will produce, out of self interest.
While I am typically a big fan of Larry Johnson’s analysis, he seems to be underestimating the effectiveness of the US blockade. Even if some, arguably quite a few, ships are successfully running it, only a pretty small minority of owners and operators are willing to take even a 1 in 20 risk of having their cargoes, vessels and crews captured. And his account indicates that it is Iranian carriers who are most willing to accept that risk.5
Early in the war, we cited a Bloomberg story (and Lloyd’s List voiced similar view) that ship owners regarded lack of safety and not lack of insurance as the big impediment to transiting the Strait of Hormuz, even to get bottled-up vessels and crews in the Gulf out. In keeping, many Chinese ships, as in ones Iran would almost certainly let pass through the Strait of Hormuz, are still stuck:6
Thai Foreign Minister: We asked for China’s help to pass 8 ships to us through the Strait of Hormuz. They told us that they are struggling to pass 70 of their ships.
— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) April 27, 2026
Vessel operators then said they wanted US/Collective West escorts through the Strait. That indicates it will take a LOT of doing for many ship owners to get comfortable with an Iran (+ Oman?) operated transit scheme. So even in the highly unlikely scenario of Trump defying Israel and accepting the humiliation of leaving the Strait of Hormuz in Iran’s, it seems that it would take even longer than even the pessimistically-minded assume for transit levels to go back to the old normal. It is not just a matter of getting ships unsnarled. Shipowners may hold back due to lack of trust in Iran, as in they will want to see the new procedures operating well before they will jeopardize vessels and cargoes.
_____
1 This is completely speculative, but recall the report by Larry Johnson confirmed by others that Trump had asked the military to ready a nuclear strike on Iran and they have flat-out refused. One can imagine Trump ranting that if they are denying him that option, they need to tell him what he could do.
2 The press is suggesting that an attack would be strictly bombing, but the US has gotten a lot of special forces in theater, so Iran is sure to see that as in play.
3 That may seem like coals to Newcastle, but Iran getting more crude to Russia in a setting of serious global shortages should allow Russia to increase its exports in similar amounts.
4 Iran may also be considering that letting itself regularly being in the position of reacting to Trump is sub-optimal. In chess, in theory in a perfectly played game, the best black can do is fight to a draw, while white can win. Similarly, Scott Ritter has stressed the effectiveness of the OODA loop, of forcing the opponent to react to you.
5 From Johnson in The Assassination Myth, And Iran Continues to Run the Blockade:
US Navy ships are staying 200 miles offshore from the Iranian coast. If they try to move closer to the Iranian coast they will be vulnerable to missile and drone attacks. All Iran has to do is sail its tankers 50 miles offshore in order to bypass the US blockade, which appears to be what Iran is doing.
Reuters/Kpler data reported at least 6 ships crossed in the 24 hours covering April 29 (mostly dry bulk carriers and some through Iranian waters, including sanctioned vessels like the Vast Plus chemical tanker). Other tracking (e.g., Anadolu Agency/Windward) noted around 13–14 total transits in similar periods, far below the pre-war norm of 125–140 daily.
Iranian vessels dominate the limited traffic: Many (often about half in recent days) load at Iranian ports in defiance of the US blockade and use IRGC-designated routes. A Fars News Agency report (via Middle East Monitor) claimed 52 Iranian vessels (31 oil tankers + 21 cargo ships) breached the blockade in a 72-hour window ending around April 28. This suggests a notable number of Iranian-linked movements around that time, but no breakdown isolates April 29 alone.
6 The impediment may also have been operational, as the Thai pleas suggest, in that Iran had not sorted out how to run its transit operation efficiently and thus could only let a few ships pass daily until it had worked things out, which clearly had not happened as of when the US imposed its blockade.
